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I.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
A.

FERREBEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARlfr OF ENHANCEMENT VALUE
FOR PROXIMITY TO THE AIRPORT
The lower court erred in awarding an enhancement value to

Ferrebee because of the proximity of his property to the Airport.
The lower Court awarded Ferrebee an enhancement value which more
that doubled the value of his property.

R. 410. The lower

court's erroneous conclusion to make such an award is reviewed on
a correction of error or de novo standard because contrary to the
claims of Ferrebee the question of the aw&rd of an enhancement is
a question of law.

United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 19-21

n.14 (1970).
A property owner cannot claim enhancement value for property
taken in a second, completely separate, condemnation action where
the property was "probably within the scojpe of the project . .
."(emphasis added).

United States v. Milder, 317 U.S. 369, 377

(1942).
If a landowner's property increases in value
because of the government projedt, the
government need not pay this enhancement
value unless (1) the property wa s not within
the original scope of the projeqt; or (2) the
government failed to provide the public with
adequate notice of the project s cope, see
United States v. 2353.28 Acres of Land, 414
F.2d 965 (5th Circ. 1969); or (3) the
landowner reasonably believed that subsequent
government action removed the property from
the project scope (citations omitted).
United States v. 49.01 Acres of Land, 669 p.2d 1364, 1367 (10th
Circ. 1982).

Ferrebee makes no claim that the government failed

to provide him notice of the project scope because it was
1

sufficient for the government to put him on notice by publicly
disclosing its plans which indicated a contemplated use of his
property in the project. JId. at 1368. As to Ferrebee's
remaining arguments, that his property was not within the
original scope of the plan or that it had been removed by
subsequent action, the courts have always placed a "heavy burden"
on landowners to prove such claims. JTd.

In this instance there

is absolutely no evidence to support Ferrebee's arguments and the
lower court made specific findings of fact contrary to his
assertions.
Ferrebee wrongly and confusingly argues that his property
was "not contemplated" in the original planning.
Brief p. 21.l

See Appeal

The lower court made a specific finding of fact

that, "The county's original airport layout plan for the airport
included approximately sixty-eight (68) acres of Ferrebee's
eighty (80) acre parcel.

Approximately twelve (12) of the

Ferrebee acres were not included in the county's original plan.
. . . . On May 16, 1986, after the initial construction of the
airport, the County filed this action to condemn the remaining
forty-three (43) acres of the Ferrebee property (the "Subject
1

Ferrebee tries to imply that because the initial
construction of the Airport was only a partial construction of the
full plan that the rest of the Airport development was an expansion
project un-anticipated by the original plan. See appeal Brief, p.
21. Ferrebee cites nothing from the record that would support this
implication.
In fact the record indicates that at all times
relevant to the development of the Airport all of Ferrebee's
property was targeted for taking. R. 435, at 26, 34, 35, 62, 67,
148, 158, 160, 202, 207-208, 238.
2

Property")."

R. 412. The record is uniform and replete with

reference to the fact that from the very inception of the idea
for the airport all 80 acres of the parcel owned by Ferrebee were
designated for acquisition.

R. 435, at 26, 34, 35, 62, 67, 148,

158, 160, 202, 207-208, 238.2
The lower court's finding accurately reflects the fact that
68 acres of the Ferrebee property were included within the
boundary set for the construction of the airport as originally
planned.

The record also makes it clear that the remaining 12

acres, not included within the actual construction of the Airport
was an uneconomic remainder in the form ot a strip of land 100
feet wide by approximately a mile and a h£lf long which the
county understood would have to be acquired because it was
landlocked and could not be put to any re£l use by the owner.
Id.

Through its various developmental phases and modifications

at no point did the county determine to t^ke less than the full
acreage owned by Ferrebee.

There is no evidence in the record,

and Ferrebee cites none, that the scope off the original project
was "abandoned."
Ferrebee tries to imply that because only part of his
property was taken in the first condemnation proceeding in 1976
that this "clearly expressed an alteration!" from the original
2

While Ferrebee argues that "During the course of planning
and construction of the airport under the original plan the
acquisition of additional land was not dontemplated", he cites
nothing from the record to support this allegation. See Appeal
Brief, p. 21.

plan as to create a reasonable expectation that his property had
been removed from the project scope.
Acres of Land, supra, at 1376.

United States v. 49.01

This implication is neither

support by the facts of this case or the law.3

The record

reflects that the Ferrebee property was always designated for
acquisition.

Furthermore, the record indicates that only part of

Ferrebee's property was taken in the first condemnation action
because the County did not have the money to purchase all of his
property the first time around.

R. 435, at 123.

The County's

inability to acquire all of Ferrebee's land in the first
proceeding does not, as a matter of law, establish a removal of
the property from the original project or give Ferrebee a
reasonable belief that his property had been removed from the
scope of the project/

For example, in the United States v.

65.0 Acres of Land, 728 F.2d 417 (10th Circ., 1984), the court
addressed the issue of the government's acquisition of an
"uneconomic remainder" which was not condemned in the first
Ferrebee cites no reference to the recorded to either
establish or justify his now claimed expectation that his property
was not designated to be taken by the County. Furthermore, there
was never any evidence illicite at trial which would substantiate
a claim that the County had abandoned its intention to acquire
Ferrebee's property.
A

It is important to note that Ferrebee never testified that
he thought that his property had been removed from the scope of the
project, nor that he ever believed , at any point, that the County
did not want all his land for the Airport project. Furthermore,
Ferrebee cites nothing from the record to support a contention that
he did not expect the County to acquire the remainder of his
property by condemnation, or other wise, after the first
condemnation action was begun.
4

condemnation proceeding because of insufficient funds.

The court

held that
One of the basic premises underlying Miller
and its progeny is that the government should
not, could not, be expected to condemn all of
the land needed for a particular project at
the same time. The testimony at trial was
that the government did not condemn the 32.5
acres when it condemned the 515 acres because
of insufficient funds. As a ma ter of law,
such actions in and of themselves do not
remove land from the scope of tjie project.
Id. at 420.
From the unequivocal findings of the lower Court at least 32
of the acres involved in this condemnation action were within the
scope of the Airport project from the beginning.3

Furthermore,

the record also supports the fact that the remaining 12 acres was
an uneconomic remainder which the County recognized that it would
have to acquire as part of its development of the Airport.6
5

Ferrebee's statement that "Acquisition of the subject
property in the second condemnation was thus not within the scope
of the original project, nor was it within Ferrebee's reasonable
expectations" Appeal Brief, p. 23, is a blatant mis-statement of
the facts of this case and the findings of the lower court.
6

Ferrebee's counsel proposed in the initial proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Submitted to the lower
court paragraphs which tried to cast the pounty's taking of his
property as two separate takings unrelated to an overall plan for
development of the Airport. These proposed findings were objected
to by the County on the basis that all Ferrebee's land was
projected for taking from the inception of the Airport plan and
that nothing changed or varied that fact. R. 335, 369. The lower
court's finding that the 1976 condemnation action is unrelated to
the 1986 action is not, as Ferrebee tries to imply a finding that
the property condemned in 1986 was not within the scope of the
original project. The lower court made as its first finding of
fact that Ferrebee's property was identified for taking from the
beginning. R. 409.
5

Because the Ferrebee property was always contemplated for
acquisition, no award for enhancement of his property for its
proximity to the Airport can be awarded as a matter of law.

The

lower court clearly erred in making such an award.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING FERREBEE'S
APPRAISAL AS THE BEST ESTIMATE OF HIS PROPERTY'S FAIR MARKET
VALUE
Not only is Ferrebee's appraisers' appraisal defective as a

matter of law because he provides an enhancement value for
Ferrebee's property's because of its projected used in
conjunction with the Airport, the lower court abused it's
discretion in accepting Ferrebee's appraisal as the best estimate
of the fair market value because it failed to prove the
property's alleged higher and better use and in failing to strike
portions of his appraisal because it was based on incompetent and
inadmissable evidence.
1.

FERREBEE DID NOT CARRY HIS BURDEN OF PROOF AS TO A
HIGHER AND BETTER USE

From the record, it is clear that Ferrebee's property is and
has always be€*n used for agricultural purpose.

The County

appraisers value the property based on its agricultural use, and
Ferrebee's appraisers contended that it had a higher and better
use, in conjunction with the Airport.

Ferrebee has the burden of

proof to establish a claimed higher and better use which he
failed to do.
In State v. Jacobs, 397 P.2d 463, 464 (Utah 1964), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that "the owner of property under a
6

condemnation is entitled to a value baseti upon the highest and
best use to which it could be put at the time of the taking,
without limitation as to the use then actually made of it.
However, the projected use affecting a value, must be not only
possible, but reasonably probable.

It miist not be merely in the

realm of speculation because the land is adaptable to a
particular use in the remote and uncertain future."
demonstrated in the County's

opening

bri&f

As was

Ferrebee failed to

establish the three elements of feasibility to support his claim
of a higher and better use.7
Because Ferrebee's property was always anticipated as being
included within the final development of the airport, analysis of
its higher and better use can not be premised on the idea that it
would be used in conjunction with the airport.

Even assuming

that future airport use, e.g., commercial or industrial
development, could be taken into consideration, Ferrebee had to
demonstrate that the three elements of feasibility existed for
that higher and better use.

In this instance, the elements that

7

Ferrebee contends that the three Elements of feasibility
referenced in the County's brief are merely academic dialogue and
not based in relevant law. The three part test is clearly a part
referred to by the County has firm footing jln case law derived from
this and other jurisdictions. See, Brink^rhoff, Eminent Domain;
Proving Highest and Best Use of Undeveloped! Land in Utah, 1973 Utah
L. Rev. , 705 (1973 Wand the cases cited tjherein): Movie v. Salt
Lake City, 176 P.2d 582 (Utah 1947); State v. Jacobs, 397 P.2d 463
(Utah 1964).
Furthermore, that three part test, is the very
backbone of the analysis of Mr. Ferrebee's appraiser. He cites the
three factors in is appraisal as those which must be met to
establish the property's highest and best use. R. 434, at 11
Exhibits 91 and 92.
7

are most notably lacking are those relating to legal and economic
feasibility.
It is well recognized that the landowner carries the burden
of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that zoning
will be changed to permit the proposed higher and better use.
State v. Jacobs, supra.

It is also understood and accepted that

proving "the existence of a reasonable probability by means of
expert opinion has been held to be impermissible, since this
involves prognostication of future legislative action."
Nichols Law of Eminent Domain, Sec. 12C.03[3].

7

Furthermore, the

clear evidence before the court as provided by the County
Director of Development established that where the Ferrebee
property was to ultimately be incorporated within the actual
physical development of the airport, the likelihood or
probability of a zoning change was zero.

Where the county zoning

ordinances precluded the higher and better use proposed by
Ferrebee, the court could not consideration the proposed higher
and better use unless the legal feasibility was established.

The

record is devoid of any evidence to support Ferrebee's contention
that the zoning would have been change to permit his proposed
use.
As to the economic feasibility of the proposed higher and
better use, Ferrebee contends that the focus is only on the
reasonable probability of the use. Appellate Brief at 26.
Important in the consideration of the reasonableness of the
8

probability of the proposed higher and bfetter use is the use
"must not be merely in the realm of speculation because the land
is adaptable to a particular use in the remote and uncertain
future."

State v. Jacobs, supra/ at 464•

All of the evidence

that is represented by Ferrebee to substantiate a reasonable
probability of his proposed use relate atfe his appraiser's review
of aviation studies that were thoroughly and completely rejected
by the county.

Furthermore, at the time of the condemnation

action, there was absolutely no viable market for the use
proposed by Mr. Ferrebee.

R. 435, at 155, 305-6; R. 434, at 127.

State v. Hopkins, 29 Utah 2d 131, 506 P. ?d 57 (1973), State vs.
Tedesco, 4 Utah 2d 248, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956).

The fact that

there was no viable market for his proposed use was in fact
recognized by Ferrebee's appraisers.
p.6; R. 434, at 128.

R. 439, at 795, Exhibit 21,

Specifically, Mr. Cook conceded that there

was no demand for commercial development in or near the airport
and that his conclusions as to future possible uses were merely
"forward thinking".

R. 434, at 11, Exhibit 91, p. 28.

Ferrebee

has failed to carry his burden of proof as to the higher and
better use upon which he bases his appraisal.
2.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING THE
COOK APPRAISAL BECAUSE IT IS BASpD ON INCOMPETENT AND
INADMISSABLE EVIDENCE.

Ferrebee attempts to avoid the county's arguments concerning
the improper basis for his expert's appraisal by contending that
the inadmissible and hearsay evidence used in his appraisal was
9

not intended to be direct substantive evidence of the property's
value but instead merely supports and corroborates the opinion of
the expert.

This argument misses the point.

The lower court

admitted into evidence Phil Cook's appraisal and then accepted
the appraisal as the basis for its findings as to fair market
value.8

R. 411.

First, it must be understood that the

approach taken by Ferrebee's appraiser was to provide a
comparable sale valuation.

The very heart of such an appraisal

is the selection of property which is "reasonably comparable".
"The requirement is that a [comparable sale] meet the test of
"reasonable comparability.'

That is, that these factors exist in

sufficient similarity that the sale can fairly be regarded as
having some probative value in arriving at a proper appraisal of
the property", Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake v. Mitsui, Inc.
522 P.2d 1370, 1373 (Utah 1979).
It must be remembered, however, that the comparison is
made with lands which are similar to the land taken.
Of course, only such parcels may be compared where the
dissimilarities are reduced to a minimum and allowances
made for such dissimilarities. It is, therefore,
imperative to consider such differences as may exist in
a physical and environmental condition and in proper
allowance made to cover any differential that may exist
by virtue of the difference in the time of the sale.
It is evident that there may be considerable difference
in the size, shape, situation, and immediate
surroundings of two estates, and perhaps in other
respects, an enterprise in which one bought may be a
8

The lower court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
read: "The appraisal of Phil Cook, Ferrebee's appraiser, is the
best estimate of the fair market value of the Subject Property, and
it is adopted by the Court as the true market value of the Subject
Property." R. 411.
10

substantial assistance in determining tne value of the other.
5 Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain/ Sec. 2JL.3 [1], page 231
(Emphasis in original).

Thus, the critical inquiry that must be

made is whether the property is truly comparable.

In this

instance, evidence concerning an enhancement value to the
property was provided in the Phil Cook's appraisal which was
premised on inadmissable hearsay opinion^ which could not be
examined and whose reliability could not be attested to.
The process that Mr. Cook used to anrive at his "enhancement
value" was to contact individuals, whose credentials and
experience in valuing property was unknown, and inquired
concerning sales of property located near rural airports.
434, at 167-8.

R.

To establish that the salfes included a particular

value for proximity to an airport he then inquired as to that
individual's opinion as to what similar property not adjacent to
their airport sold for.

R. 434, at 167-8 * Once that opinion was

solicited, the difference between that property and the sale
neighboring the airport was calculated, and became the basis for
enhancement value to be applied to Ferreb^e's property.

R. 434,

Exhibit 91, pp. 42-43.
While Rule 703 of the Utah Rules of Evidence allows an
expert to testify from hearsay "facts and data", it does not, and
should not, permit an appraiser to shield the essential questions
of comparability behind the opinion of another.

In this

instance, the comparability of the properties used to establish
the enhancement factor was based on another's analysis.
11

The

reliability and credibility of that essential analysis was beyond
the scope of cross examination and beyond the investigation of
the court.

Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, 235

A.2d 295, cert, denied, 390 U.S. 1006.

The lower court abused

its discretion in permitting into evidence Cook's appraisal
without striking the inadmissable hearsay evidence.
Furthermore, much of the information provided as to actual
sales near other rural airports involved amounts that were paid
under the threat of condemnation or as a final award in a
condemnation action.

It is recognized that amounts paid through

condemnation are not an appropriate basis for the calculation of
fair market value.

Such information should not be admitted for

the purpose of determining value.

See cases cited in County's

opening brief page 32.9

Honolulu Redevelopment Agency v. Pun Gun, 426 P. 2d 324,
(Hawaii 196 7) cited by Ferrebee in support of his contention that
awards in condemnation may be admitted in evidence to demonstrate
value under a comparable sales approach does not go as far as
Ferrebee claims. "The better view is that such evidence should not
be automatically underlined excluded as a matter of law. If it can
be shown to the satisfaction of the trial court that the price paid
was sufficiently voluntary to be a reasonable index of value or
that there is a necessity for the evidence because the only sales
of comparable property in the area in recent years have been to the
condemnor, such evidence should be admitted." Id.., at 325. This
position appears to be a minority view. Furthermore, Ferrebee did
not demonstrate that the prices paid in those condemnation actions
were sufficiently voluntary to be either reliable or competent.

12

C.

THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY LIMITED FERREBEE'S RECOVERY BECAUSE
HIS PROPERTY WAS LANDLOCKED
Ironically, Ferrebee challenges the lower court's

calculation of the reduction in value of his property for lack of
access-

Ferrebee contests the court's calculation of the lack of

access based on what Ferrebee contends i$ an inadmissable option
agreement.

Ferrebee's claim is ironic because the option

agreement referred to by the lower court in its Findings of Fact
was concocted by his own attorneys to enhance the value of his
property in preparation for this litigation.

R. 439, at 658-66.

The creation of the option is also ironic because Ferrebee had to
state a value for the property to be acquired for access which
would approximate the amount that he was Remanding for his
property in order to justly his demands.

When that option was

then presented to demonstrate that access was available for the
property, the lower court felt compelled to accept that option,
not as an assessment of the property's fair market value, but as
the actual cost of access which had been hegotiate by Ferrebee.
Besides the irony created by Ferrebee's argument, his claims are
without force because he did not object td the introduction in
evidence of the option at the time of trictl/ and did not raise
the issue of the inadmissability of the option when the lower
court made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Finally,

contrary to Ferrebee's argument the option was not admitted as
evidence of fair market value of Ferrebee'Is property but was
introduced to demonstrate what Ferrebee had negotiated to provide
13

access to his property.

In any event, regardless of the

admissability of the option, Ferrebee's own appraiser, Phil Cook,
who was relied upon by the lower court to establish fair market
value, for the property, stated that the Ferrebee property was
subject to a deduction in the same amount as the option because
it was land locked.
40-42.

R. 411, 434, at 11, Exhibits 91 and 92, pp

Mr. Cook arrived at that same deduction based on

considerations which were independent from the option.10
At the time the documents reflecting the option for access
were offered in evidence, and the testimony relating to that
option was accepted by the court, Ferrebee's counsel did not
object to the admissibility of that evidence.11

In addition, at

the end of the trial the lower court requested that Ferrebee's
counsel prepare proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
in keeping with the lower court's Bench Ruling.

Several drafts

of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were prepared by
Ferrebee's counsel, objections to the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law were submitted by the County and argued before
the lower court.

At no time did Ferrebee's counsel ever object

10

Both of the appraisers provided by the County determined
that the Ferrebee property was landlocked and an appropriate
deduction was made. It is important to note that the County's
appraisers and Ferrebee's appraiser, Phil Cook, agreed that the
appropriate deduction was $19,400. R. 439, at 554, Exhibit 17; R.
437, at 370, Exhibit 11; R. R. 434, at 11, Exhibits 91 and 92.
11

The County in a pre-trial Motion in Limine moved to have
evidence of the option excluded from evidence. Ferrebee actively
objected to the County's Motion, and the lower court declined to
excluded the €>vidence. R. 177 and 196.
14

to the court's use of to the option on tlie basis that it was
inadmissable or for any other reason, and the final Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, as prepared by Ferrebee's counsel,
was signed by the court incorporating the lower court's use of
the option.

R, 334, 367A, 398, 403, 416, 418, Ferrebee never

raised the with the lower court the issue that it is now raising
on appeal.

"[I]n order to preserve a plea of error, the alleged

error must have been raised seasonably by counsel to the trial
court.

The purpose of this rule is to alllow the trial court to

correct any error, if error there be."

U^ah County v. Brown, 672

P.2d 83, 85 (Utah 1983), Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc.,
786 P.2d 1350 (Utah App. 1990), Mascaro v< Davis, 741 P.2d 938
(Utah 1987).

By not raising this issue with the lower court

Ferrebee has waived his right to raise it now.

Utah County v.

Brown, supra.
Regardless of the admissibility of the option in determining
the final fair market value of the property (it should be noted,
however, that the option was not admitted for the purpose of
determining fair market value, but for the purpose of
establishing access to the property negotiated and provided by
Ferrebee) Ferrebee's own appraiser, disregarded Ferrebee's option
for access and using other comparables arrJLved at a deduction
because the property was landlocked.

The Reduction was almost

exactly the same value as the option price+

Ferrebee's

appraiser, Phil Cook, determined that it w^s appropriate to
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reduce the base agricultural value of the property by $19,400
because the property was landlocked.

In his testimony to the

court, and in his appraisal, he indicated that he examined the
impact of the property being landlocked from several different
perspectives, including the negotiated access at $5,000 per acre
and concluded: "there are inherent risks associated with
purchasing landlocked property.

A prudent investor would

discount the price to reflect these risks.

The discount in this

case would likely range from a nominal amount to 37%." R. 434,
at 11 Exhibits 91 and 92, pp 40-4 2.

Mr. Cook went on to state

that: "In this case, there is as much evidence to suggest a
nominal discount as to suggest a large discount of 37%.
Nevertheless, a prudent investor would be conservative in
concluding this cost.

A full 37% discount is applied."

R. at

11, Exhibit 92, p. 43.
The lower court relied on Ferrebee's evidence of his own
dealing to provided access to his otherwise landlocked property
in determining what deductions were appropriate.

The access

provided by way of option would cost the County $19,400.
Ferrebee's own appraiser concluded that the fair market value of
the property necessitated a discount because it was landlocked,
based on his independent assessment, of an amount which was
comparable to the option.

Thus, regardless of how the amount was

arrived at, it was appropriate that the property be discounted
because it was landlocked.
16

D.

FERREBEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARfr OF ATTORNEYS FEES
Utah law permits an award of attorneys fees under only two

conditions— where they are provided for by contract or
statute,12

Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149^ 151 (Utah 1983).

Ferrebee sought an award of attorneys fe^s in the lower court
under Utah Code Annotated §78-27-56 for bad faith conduct of the
County in its initiating this condemnation action.

The lower

court in its Bench Ruling rejected Ferrekfee's request stating, "I
am denying them under that section becaus|e I think that the
county's actions as far as the straight condemnation case were
not that bad."

R. 431, at 6.

No attorney's fees were awarded by

the lower court.
The lower court as part of its Bench Ruling held that with
regard to claims made by Ferrebee under the Utah Relocation
Assistance Act, Utah Code §57-12-1, et. seft, and the Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Land Acquisition Policies Act of 1970,
42 U.S.C. §4601, et seg, (hereafter referred to as the State and
Federal Relocation Assistance Acts), thos0 acts did not apply in
this case.13

The Court went on to commented that "The Court is

12

Attorneys fees are "non-compensable as 'just compensation'"
in condemnation actions; "compensation for such costs . . . in a
condemnation action is a matter of legislative prerogative and must
be provided by statute." Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 785
P.2d 112, 1123 (Utah App. 19 89)(citations and footnotes omitted).
13

The lower court held in its Conclusions of Law that "the
Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code §57-12-1, et. seg. does
not apply to this case" and that "the Uniform Relocation Assistance
and Land Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §4601, et
seg. , does not apply to this case." R. 409-10. The Relocation
Assistance Acts are meant to apply only where a person is
"displaced", from his property by the ac^ of the condemnation,
17

of the opinion that if the State and Federal Relocation Act did
apply, that attorney fees may be applicable.

But based on the

otherwise, I would not award attorney fees in this case."
4 31, at 3, 5.

R.

When pressed further as to whether the court

would award attorneys fees if the State and Federal Relocation
Acts applied, the court stated, "Well, I'll indicate to you that
I would be inclined to award attorneys fees.

But, I hesitate to

say that, and I am not ruling that way because of the fact that I
don't want this to be an appeal just to get some attorneys fees.
So I'm not saying that I will definitively do it, but I am saying
that that is the way I was looking at it."

R. 431, at 6.

Apparently tantalized by the lower courts observations Ferrebee
has now proceeded to do exactly as the lower court feared, he
filed this appeal for the purpose of seeking attorney's fees.
The review of a trial court's decision to refuse an award
of attorneys fees is reviewable on an abuse of discretion
standard.

Canyon Country Stores v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414, 421

(Utah 1989).

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

denying attorney's fees in this instance.
First it should be noted that the State and Federal
Relocation Assistance Acts do not create an independent basis for
i.e., the land owner is removed from his place of residence or
business. In this instance, Ferrebee's property was raw land on
which he neither carried on a business or had a place of residence,
thus he was not displaced within the meaning of the act. Where the
Acts did not apply to this condemnation action, the procedural
safeguard of the act are neither applicable to nor binding on the
county.
18

an award of attorneys fees.
42 U.S.C. §4601, et seq.

See, Utah Code §57-12-1, et seq, and

Even if those Acts applied to the facts

of this case, which the lower court found that they do not, R.
431, at 2,

they do not permit the court to award attorneys fees.

See, Cady v. Johnson, supra.
Ferrebee tries to boot-strap the lower courts findings that
even though the State and Federal Relocation Assistance Acts do
not apply that the County did not follow their procedures to
create the implication that the County acted in bad faith in
bring this action.

The lower court refused to make the very

finding that Ferrebee is trying to establish by implication, and
there is certainly nothing in the record which indicates that the
lower court abused its discretion in so ruling.
An award of attorneys fees under §78-27-56 requires the
finding of "two elements . . . first, the claim must be without
merit", and the "plaintiff's conduct in bringing suit was lacking
in good faith."

Cady v. Johnson, supra, at 151. Neither of

these elements are found in this case, and the specific findings
of the court support its determination that none should be
awarded.
"Without merit" is defined by the Utah court as "bordering
on frivolity" or "of little weight or importance having no basis
of law or fact."

Cady v. Johnson, supra.

There is nothing in

the record that would indicate that the County's suit for
condemnation was frivolous or has no basis in law and fact.
19

Apparently, Ferrebee does not even contend that such is the case.
Rather, Ferrebee completely ignores this element of the test and
focuses solely on the second requirement that the suit be lacking
in good faith.
Lacking in good faith is defined as
(1) an honest belief in the propriety of the
activities in question; (2) no intent to take
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3)
no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that
the activities in question will hinder, delay
or defraud others.
Cady v. Johnson, supra., at 151.
Ferrebee contends that the acts of the county leading up to
the condemnation actions were "reprehensible and flagrantly
abusive".

Appeal Brief, at 44.

In particular, Ferrebee points

to an alleged lack of honesty on the part of the County in
offering $275 per acre for Ferrebee's property when the County
had prior appraisals for $4,500 an acre and $1,750 an acre.

The

history of the negotiations with Ferrebee were clearly and fully
laid out in the County's original Appellate Brief.

Nothing in

the record supports Ferrebee's contention that the County was
dishonest in its use of the $275 appraisal for the basis of its
offer.

However, for the sake of clarity, a review of the record

reflects that the County's $275 offer was based on an appraisal
of a thoroughly qualified appraiser, whose appraisal have been
criticized by another appraiser and then he had been given an
opportunity to respond to that criticism and to justify his
appraisal.

R. 435, at 101-6, 205-6, 437, at 391, Exhibit 13.The
20

other County appraisals which ranged from $4,500 an acre to $1750
an acre could not be used for the basis for an offer to Ferrebee
when the offer was made because they were out of date.

It was

during the County's preparations to make a final offers for the
property that it was first discovered that property values in the
area had dropped dramatically.

R. 437, at 352-62.

The county

went through the review appraisal to properly certify that the
$275 per acre offer was appropriate.
Nothing in the record would indicate that the county did not
have an honest belief in the propriety of its actions, and
Ferrebee has pointed to nothing which would indicate that the
county intended to defraud or take unconscionable advantage of
him.
The court's finding as to the good faith actions of the
county are substantiated by the record, and the lower court did
not abused its discretion in denying an award of attorneys fees.
E.

FERREBEE IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS IN THE FORM OF
HIS EXPERT WITNESS FEES
There is no statutory authority which would permit the lower

court to award costs against the County in the form of Ferrebee's
expert witness fees.

Furthermore, Ferrebee has waiver his right

to have the matter considered in this appeal because he failed to
properly raise the issue before the lower court.
Section 78-34-1 jet seq. which governs condemnation actions
in Utah does not provided for an award of costs to the landowner
21

for his expenses in retaining an appraiser to provide an
appraisal or testimony.

Furthermore, the most recent statement

of the Utah Courts on this subject indicates that they are not
recoverable.

Redevelopment Agency v. Daskalas, 785 P.2d 1112.

1124 (Utah App. 1989) .
Finally, Ferrebee did not fully raise the question of the
award of cost before the lower court.

In a discussion at the

time the lower courts entered his Bench Ruling, Ferrebee's
counsel asked for an award of cost, including the his expenses in
providing expert appraisals.
MR. SCHMUTZ

One final point, your Honor, with respect to
cost. Should I submit a bill of costs?
Certainly the primary costs are the $12- or
$13,000 in appraisal fees. The Court has
adopted the appraisal fee — one of those
appraisals. And I would be submitting a bill
of costs and wonder if the Court could give
me any direction whether those costs would be
awarded.

THE COURT:

Well, do you have any comment?

MR. THOMAS:

There is no provision for the award of cost,
your Honor.

THE COURT:

I would state this to you: That you have the
right to submit your cost bill. Right now, I
would indicate to you that appraisal costs
would not be a billable cost as far as what
you would be entitled to under a cost bill.
MR. SCHMUTZ: Your Honor, if I may have leave,
I would like to argue that this is an unusual
case where the issue is value, and it isn't
as though an expert is being called to
determine standard of care. The ultimate
issue that the Court finds, that it's adopted
in the form of the Cook appraisal — we were
forced as a
22

defendant to set forth the value for the
land. And I think this is a case where,
under the discretion of the Court, those
costs can be awarded.
THE COURT:

R. 431, at 8-9.

Well, I am not cuttinlg you off now. But I'll
indicate to you that before you spent your
time to argue it, you better have some law to
give me as far as the costs are concerned.
Ferrebee's counsel did not pursue the matter

further and did not provided the Court with any authority which
would permit the Court to award the costs that he sought.14
II.
CONCLUSION
The lower court committed reversible error in awarding an
enhance value to Ferrebee based on the property's proximity to the
Airport.

In addition the lower court abused its discretion in

accepting

Ferrebee's

appraiser's

appraisal

as

the

basis

for

valuation. The Court should reject the findings and conclusions of
the lower court and remand the matter for the entry of findings
which are consistent with the appraisals provided by the County.
Finally, the Court should reject Ferrebee's appeal on the
issues of the lower court's use of the option evidence, attorneys'
fees and costs and award the County its costs on appeal.
DATED this ^ ^ day of January, 1992.
Stoker & Thomas

David B. Thomas
Attorneys for Plaintiff
u

Daskalas was handed down well after the Court entered its
Bench Ruling in this case in August 29, 1989.
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